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This paper investigates the philosophical tensions between secular-liberalism and Islam, and 
reviews Islamic conceptualisations of knowledge, personhood and education, in order to 
conceptualise shakhsiyah Islamiyah as an authentic and credible form of personal agency within 
an Islamic worldview. It begins by examining the liberal critique of Islamic education and 
explores notions of authority and autonomy in Islamic educational theory. It proposes that 
these tensions exist to varying degrees in all educational practice. Some theoretical work to 
develop an Islamic understanding of personal autonomy as selfhood is presented and 
translated into a concept of shakhsiyah Islamiyah. Finally, the possibility of understanding 
shakhsiyah Islamiyah as a dialogical Muslim-self is explored.  
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Introduction 
This paper scrutinises the philosophical tensions between secular-liberalism and Islam, and 
reviews Islamic conceptualisations of personhood and education, in order to develop a deeper 
understanding of shakhsiyah Islamiyah1 as an authentic and credible form of personal 
autonomy within the Islamic worldview. It has two-fold aims; first, to address misconceptions 
of Islamic education as indoctrination that has no place in a secular-liberal world; and second 
 
1 This is a compound term and there is no short definition. Details of how the term has been put together, it’s 
history and purposes are found in the section below called Shakhsiyah Islamiyah as Muslim Selfhood 
 
to begin to explore where and how notions of a form of autonomy might be found within a 
broad Islamic ‘philosophy’ of education. Islam has a rich history of educational thought and 
there is an emerging field in English detailing diverging perspectives (Bagheri Noaparast, 
2016; Günther, 2020; Memon & Zaman, 2016). This paper puts forward some initial ideas 
within a broad Islamic paradigm as outlined in Figure 1 and the accompanying appendix and 
hopes to launch a more nuanced and detailed debate within this emerging field.  
 
The term autonomy usually has specific secular-liberal connotations and in this configuration, 
it is not easily absorbed into an Islamic worldview. In this regard, I sometimes use the term 
agency to express features of personal autonomy when discussing Islamic notions of this 
concept. It would be disingenuous and superficial to simply claim shakhsiyah as a form of 
autonomy without rigorous theoretical interrogation from both secular-liberal and Islamic 
perspectives. It is also essential to address the critique of Islamic education as transmission-
based and teacher-centred if a claim about an Islamic notion of autonomy is to be taken 
seriously. This paper therefore proceeds through a theoretical analysis of similarities and 
differences between Islamic educational theory and secular-liberal conceptualisations of 
dialogic pedagogy. Whilst there are complex and nuanced variations within each tradition, 
for the purposes of this paper, I work with broadly conceived notions of each tradition in 
order to frame the discussion, develop a comparative argument and present some ideas. 
Limitations of space prevent a more nuanced discourse of intra-tradition variation.  
 
I begin by discussing and problematising the liberal critique of Islamic education. I then 
present an outline of typologies of Muslim education and introduce holistic Islamic education, 
before exploring notions of authority and autonomy in Islamic education. I propose that these 
tensions exist to varying degrees in all educational practice. I then develop an Islamic 
understanding of autonomy as selfhood and translate it into the concept of shakhsiyah 
Islamiyah. Finally, I explore the possibility of understanding shakhsiyah Islamiyah as a 
dialogical Muslim-self.  
 
Secular-liberal theory, education and personal autonomy 
A useful definition of personal autonomy that is authentic to the enlightenment rationalist 
secular-liberal tradition is detailed in Table 1. This definition is predicated in agency and 
describes specific personal characteristics, including questioning, reasoning, critical thinking 
and taking a position. In doing so, this definition offers opportunities to consider these 
features of autonomous thought in relation to features of productive educational dialogue. It 
also allows for an evaluation of whether such educational dialogue encourages the 
development of these features in those who engage in it on a regular basis.  
 
Table 1 Characteristics of an autonomous individual (Dearden, 1975, p. 7) 
 
Having offered an established liberal conceptualisation of autonomy, I shall now interrogate 
the assumptions underpinning it and the liberal dilemma that it has generated.  
 
The liberal dilemma 
There is a growing body of literature on what has been called the ‘liberal dilemma’ 
(Burtonwood, 2000, p. 269), where the fact of pluralism, that is the existence of faith-based 
education in secular-liberal societies (Alexander, 2015; Merry, 2007), demonstrates 
incongruity between the liberal values of equality and autonomy.  This dilemma refers to the 
challenges liberals face from cultural and communitarian groups who do not prioritise liberal 
values, particularly the value of personal autonomy (Burtonwood, 1998). Classical liberalism, 
with its rationalist and enlightenment heritage, has become open to the accusation that it is a 
monism shaped by the Christian and colonial heritage of Europe (Parekh, 2002). Parekh 
contends that classical liberals like Locke, Montesquieu, Kant and Mill, drew on Greek 
rationalism and Christian universalism to devise a worldview, which justified the colonial 
endeavour as a means of bringing a vision of the good life, that is critical rationality, choice 
and personal autonomy, to backward peoples. According to classical liberalism, this vision 
can be rationally demonstrated and is thus binding on all human beings (Parekh, 2002). 
Parekh’s argument bears some similarity to the UK government narrative of Fundamental 
British Values as a means of assimilating non-liberal values and cultures, which has been 
extensively problematized as seriously damaging to Muslim educational experiences in UK 
state schools (Faure-Walker, 2019; O’Donnell, 2016; Sian, 2015). Similar developments are 
happening in other ‘western’ contexts and directly impacting Muslim children and young 
people.  
 
The difficulty for classical liberalism is that the argument that personal autonomy rests on 
truths considered rationally demonstrable and universal has been widely challenged. Whilst 
classical liberalism argues that reason must challenge dogma, many communitarians and non-
western peoples challenge non-negotiable liberal truths as dogmatic and oppressive.  The 
classical liberal argument is that secular education is essentially neutral, and enables 
impressionable young children to make autonomous decisions about their beliefs; in contrast 
to faith education which necessarily proclaims ‘self-evident’ truths (K. Moti Gokulsing, 2006) 
about the superiority of that faith, and is thus indoctrinatory, limiting children’s right to 
autonomy (Parker-Jenkins et al., 2005; Tinker, 2009). This perspective has been undermined 
by the contention that the liberal definition of personal autonomy is actually Eurocentric, and 
although it presents itself as rationally demonstrable, it rests on ‘self-evident’ truths about 
rationality that are far from universal, thus turning the ‘liberal dilemma’ into an intractable 
problem, as identified by the communitarian critique. In classical liberalism the concept of the 
rational autonomous individual is constructed in the abstract (Rawls, 1971).  Such an 
individual is free from any cultural context. The communitarian critique of classical liberalism 
is that human beings are always socialised into particular communities, and these 
communities will therefore influence how autonomous individuals make choices in life and 
relate to others (MacIntyre, 1989; Sandel, 1998).  
 
The liberal-communitarian debate has spawned a vast literature including feminist, religious 
and racial critiques that is increasingly focused around intersectionality. Christman and 
Anderson (2005) and Mahmood (2004) cover these issues in some depth. Burtonwood (2000) 
identifies that feminist, Afro-centric, Islamic and other critiques are partly concerned about 
the loss of communitarian values to an unfettered liberal emphasis on the individual person 
and personal autonomy. Whereas secular-liberals may feel they have won hard fought rights 
for the benefit of all, non-European communities have their own values and ideas of cultural 
development. For some westerners, the rest of the world should accept rights that they assert 
as rationally demonstrable, so that everyone can reach the same developmental stage as the 
West. Implicit in this view, however, is a notion of ‘intellectual-cultural superiority’, which 
could be described as little different to the notions of racial superiority that drove colonialism 
(Mehta, 1990). There has been some response to this in the form of the development of the 
indigenous knowledge movement and a drive for culturally-relevant pedagogy (Ahmed, 
2012; Bishop, 2008; Smith, 2003; Stonebanks, 2008). Against this broad backdrop, there has 
been specific scholarship on the issue of Islamic faith education in secular-liberal societies.  
 
Secular-liberal societies and faith-education 
The liberal-communitarian debate has generated nuanced positions on each side; which lead 
to new perspectives on individual-community relations and Islamic faith education (Merry, 
2007; Panjwani, 2009; Tan, 2014). Panjwani attempts to seek out an ‘overlapping consensus’ 
(Rawls, 1993), between Islamic and liberal conceptions of autonomy, rationality and 
educational aims, in relation to the dominant educational discourse in British Islamic faith-
schools. He argues that this approach enables social cohesion without demanding submission 
of one worldview to another. For Panjwani, it is essential to recognise the role of historicity 
and human agency in the lived enactment of both traditions; this requires new enactments 
that can achieve overlapping consensus (Panjwani, 2009). Merry’s approach is to recognise 
that liberal theory is vague about how much weight should be given to autonomy as the 
central feature of a liberal education. He highlights the tension between autonomy and 
tolerance as key liberal virtues. A disproportionate emphasis on autonomy could undermine 
tolerance by generating coercion towards a liberal lifestyle and undermining the values 
central to cultures that perceive individuals as intrinsically part of an organic holistic 
community.  Merry considers the idea of wellbeing as an alternative way of understanding 
how individuals can attain a flourishing worthwhile life. Nevertheless, wellbeing still requires 
children to have the capacity for autonomy, to be able to independently choose worthwhile 
pursuits, and to ensure the possibility of choosing a life outside of their community (Merry, 
2007). Tan (2014) accepts that rationality and autonomy are always situated within an 
ideological framework. She cites Thiessen, a Christian educator who identifies ‘normal 
rationality’ and ‘normal autonomy’ as being situated within a convictional community that 
has its own context, history, language and practices (Thiessen, 1993). Nevertheless, Thiessen’s 
conceptualisation incorporates some dimension of liberal ideology, in that there must be 
evidence for beliefs held and critical openness towards one’s worldview. This requirement for 
evidence and critical openness should not be restricted to internal questions within a tradition; 
but also requires the capacity to evaluate one’s existing worldview against other worldviews. 
This would ensure that the individual’s life choices are based on a careful evaluation of her 
own worldview, as well as alternatives. Merry and Tan go on to describe Islamic theories 
about rationality and autonomy; yet as outsiders to the Islamic tradition, they are not 
interested in constructing theory but rather, describing historical ideas.  
 
The Jewish educator, Hanan Alexander, has begun to construct liberal theory that abandons 
the claim of neutrality, and replaces the ‘view from nowhere’ (Nagel, 1989) with ‘a view from 
somewhere’ (Alexander, 2015, p.39) and generates a ‘pedagogy of difference’ (2015, p.87). 
Alexander is not satisfied with Panjwani’s appeal to Rawlsian overlapping consensus in 
dealing with the issue of faith-schools in liberal societies. He considers the Rawlsian 
conception to be still beholden to a claim of neutrality. Alexander critiques Rawls’ idea that 
‘public reason’ is dependent on a form of moral reasoning based on values and standards 
shared by everyone who enters public discourse. Alexander argues that the idea of public 
reason precludes moral reasoning based on religious traditions that give precedence to 
scripture, because these traditions do not comply with liberal values and standards of public 
reason. Thus, according to Alexander, Rawls maintains the superiority of the liberal 
enlightenment worldview. By claiming that behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ every individual 
would choose his conceptualisation of public reason, because it is the most just, Rawls 
presupposes the concept of rationality that he is using to make his argument. He neglects the 
critique that individuals do not function from behind a veil of ignorance, they do not exist in 
the abstract; they are not an unencumbered self, devoid of any type of identity.  
 
Alexander asks the question, what would a liberal education without the presumption of an 
underpinning neutrality constitute? What should an education look like if we have to begin 
with a view from somewhere? His response is the idea of ‘pedagogy of difference’. This is 
founded on the dialogic idea that we need to be both initiated into a robust vision of the good 
life, that is, a ‘thick’ robust moral description, which is not necessarily religious, and be 
educated with the capacity to step outside our worldview and critically evaluate it from an 
outsider’s perspective. As there is no neutral rational, scientific or objective stance, we have to 
step outside to some other worldview. This could be the secular-liberal worldview, and 
indeed should be so, because this is the dominant worldview in the contemporary world, 
although it should not be considered neutral.  
 
For Alexander, a worldview that has the capacity of a ‘pedagogy of difference’ is one that has 
the capacity to engage in dialogue. It affirms an intelligent spirituality, that is, a search for an 
understanding of one’s self, within the context of a learning community that has a vision of a 
transcendent higher good. Alexander goes on to define the features of such a community by 
drawing on a different liberal heritage, on the concept of ‘value pluralism’, popularised by 
Isaiah Berlin, but also to be found in the pragmatism of William James and the Deweyian 
tradition in educational philosophy. This liberal tradition offers education from a holistic 
point of view towards a way of life, but it is not totalistic. Rather it is pragmatic in the sense 
that although it begins from a particular culture, it is open to learning from experience. 
Moreover, it is synthetic, in that it is prepared to engage with opposite points of view, 
including those within which there is the potential for disagreement. Finally, it is ethical in 
the classical Greek sense of the term, in that it asks the question, what is the good life? This 
form of pragmatism relies on three presuppositions. First, the person who engages in it is a 
free agent with freewill, even if it is not total freewill. Second, this agent has moral intelligence, 
that is, the capacity to tell the difference between right and wrong, according to some moral 
theory. Finally, this agent recognises that fallibility, that is, the possibility that she might be 
wrong, is a direct consequence of freewill. Additionally, in this form of pragmatism, 
educational experiences are considered valuable, not only when the agent gets it right, but 
also when the agent gets it wrong.  For Alexander, dialogue is the necessary consequence of 
living in a world in which there is no ‘view from nowhere’ (2015, pp.81-84). In the next section 
I explore ideas of autonomy from within a broadly concieved Islamic paradigm. I am clear 
that I have adopted a particular ‘view from somewhere’; in doing so, I hope to contribute to 
developing theorizations that can support the work of Muslim educators in minority and 
majority contexts, as they grapple with the complexities of our contemporary world.  
 
Islamic educational theory and personal autonomy: the Muslim self in secular-liberal 
societies 
In this section, I explore ideas of autonomy in Islamic education, settling on a dialogical notion 
of the Muslim self as shakhsiyah Islamiyah. Returning to the idea of double-consciousness, 
Muslim selfhood faces particular challenges in secular-liberal societies. I deliberately use the 
term secular-liberal as opposed to liberal because, as Talal Asad has shown, in modern liberal 
nation-states it is the secular, itself defined through a culturally and historically constituted 
relationship with religion, manifested as an enacted representation of individual citizenship, 
that ‘redefines and transcends particular and differentiating practices of the self that are 
articulated through class, gender and religion’ (2003, p5). The liberal conception of autonomy 
is closely related to this enactment of citizenship. According to Asad (2003), Mahmood (2004), 
Habermas (2006), and Mavelli (2015), the secular, with its dependency on the conceptual 
boundaries of religion, far from being inclusive, necessarily seeks to dominate and thus 
exclude the religious self. As Habermas states, “given that in the liberal state, only secular 
reasons count, citizens who adhere to a faith are obliged to establish a kind of ‘balance’ 
between their religious and their secular convictions.” However, “many religious citizens 
would not be able to undertake such an artificial division within their own minds without 
jeopardizing their existence as pious persons” (Habermas, 2006, p. 8), thus generating double-
consciousness.  
 
The emphasis in this paper on the core liberal value of personal autonomy, is itself influenced 
by the dominant paradigm of secular-liberal thought. In dealing with this quandary, I refer to 
Mahmood’s anthropological work on female Muslim religious activists in Egypt, where she 
identifies that liberal assumptions about agency, locating it in the political and moral 
autonomy of the subject, inherently shape the study of Muslims (2004). Although Mahmood 
self-identifies as a liberal, by drawing on poststructuralist feminist literature and detaching 
the notions of agency and self-realisation from liberal autonomy, she is seeking to understand 
her subjects in their own terms, from within their own forms of consciousness. To do so, she 
recognises that the desire for freedom is not an innate universal desire, rather it is mediated 
by specific cultural and historical conditions, thus in her study the meaning of agency “cannot 
be fixed in advance but must emerge through an analysis of the particular concepts that enable 
specific modes of being, responsibility, and effectivity” (2004, pp. 14-15). Mahmood 
demonstrates that this religious negotiation is with the authority of orthodoxy, family, the 
state and the norms of liberal discourse. Nevertheless, to characterise it as autonomous 
resistance to subordination is to misunderstand the religious discourses and desires of these 
women’s activities. To proceed, a language needs to be found that represents and is “actually 
constitutive of different forms of personhood, knowledge, and experience”, as they arise 
within a particular discursive tradition (2004, p. 16).  
 
Mahmood’s paper is relevant to this study because I am seeking to draw on Islamic 
conceptions of personhood, knowledge and education, to examine specific modes of being, 
responsibility and effectivity, as a means to begin theorising shakhsiyah Islamiyah as an 
Islamic form of selfhood and agency, and as an aim of Islamic education. First, however, I 
briefly discuss some typologies of Islamic education and interrogate the concepts of autonomy 
and authority in relation to ‘teaching Islam’.  
 
Douglass and Shaikh present a useful typology for education relating to Muslims, “education 
of Muslims in their Islamic faith; education for Muslims which includes the religious and 
secular disciplines; education about Islam for those who are not Muslim; and education in an 
Islamic spirit and tradition” (2004, p. 7). This paper is concerned with the latter; its theoretical 
focus is to examine the concept of shakhsiyah Islamiyah as the goal of a tawhīdi (holistic) 
understanding of Islamic education. Figure 1 provides a conceptual map of Islamic concepts 
of knowledge, personhood and education. The appendix offers further explanation. 
 
Figure 1. Islamic concepts of knowledge, personhood and education 
 
Facing difficult questions: Islamic education, teacher authority and learner autonomy 
To begin exploring personal autonomy in relation to Islamic education, it may be helpful to 
bypass the discourse on typologies of Muslim education and ask the direct question: what do 
we mean by ‘teaching Islam’? If the word Islam is defined as attaining peace through 
submission (to the will of Allah), there immediately appears a challenge to the notion of such 
education developing autonomy. However, further exploration of what Islam requires in 
relation to submission, that is, that it comes through a free choice made by an autonomous 
individual, takes us immediately to an inherent aporia in Islam. Through its creedal premise 
of tawhīd (unity), Islam ignores what are usually perceived in the ‘Western’ mind as 
dichotomies, and thus, in the Islamic worldview, freedom from self (nafs) and others (an-nās) 
is attained through submission to Allah who is Ahad (the ultimate Unity). Furthermore, 
although Allah exhorts insān, human beings, to use their ‘aql (intellect), the use of this uniquely 
human faculty leads to a recognition of the limits of the human intellect in that Allah and the 
ghayb (unseen) cannot be properly known by it alone. Thus, whereas ‘aql has been created in 
order for the human being to recognise Allah through his āyāt (signs), recognising these signs 
of Allah, leads to a recognition of human feebleness, thereby leading to an acceptance of the 
need to become Muslim, which in Arabic is to submit to as-Ṣamad (the Absolute). Such a view 
is inherently contradictory to a humanist worldview that underpins much of contemporary 
secular-liberal thought. In Islamic discourses, free will and ‘aql are the two distinctly human 
qualities that elevate the human being above the rest of creation, enabling human autonomy 
in choosing to become Muslim (one who submits). Therefore, when we are talking about 
teaching ‘Islam,’ I propose that we are talking about teaching a learner to submit to Allah, 
because this definition arrives at the heart of the problem of autonomy in Islamic education.  
 
Moreover, the verb ‘teach’ is also at the heart of the incongruity between the terms autonomy 
and education, in that to ‘teach’ immediately implies authority. For how can there be teaching 
without authority? For many traditional Islamic educators, sacred knowledge comes from 
Allah and is not constructed by human beings: ta’līm (teaching) is transmission of sacred 
knowledge, and the teacher, as transmitter of sacred knowledge, is central to Islamic 
pedagogy. Combining the definition of Islam with this definition of teaching, it is easy yet 
fallacious, to conclude that Islamic education is pure indoctrination, because even in this 
definition of ta’līm, there is complexity. Moreover, in Islamic cultures it is well understood that 
the primary duty of the Islamic teacher is to develop the character of the learner; thus, the 
teacher-learner relationship is not just transmitting sacred knowledge but one of close direct 
interaction between student and teacher. It is through this relationship that sacred knowledge, 
reflective wisdom, and moral character are traditionally thought to have developed. So, the 
learner is not an empty vessel but very much an active agent, a seeker of knowledge who is 
looking for something from this particular teacher. Thus ‘teaching Islam’ has a complexity 
wherein the dichotomy of teaching-learning is carefully balanced and unified through a 
tawhīd worldview. Furthermore, there are other ways of defining Islamic education, which are 
detailed later in this paper, adding nuance to the already complex classical understanding of 
ta’līm. 
 
We can continue this discourse on the teacher-learner relationship by facing the challenge of 
‘teaching’ per se, as a paradoxical practice, in that in any educational situation learner 
understandings might be restricted or supplanted by teacher-intended understandings. This 
exists in all conceptualisations of education, even learner-centred ones, in that teaching cannot 
happen without teacher input and therefore it will necessarily impinge to some degree on 
learner autonomy. This is what Bonawitz et al. describe as the “double-edged sword of 
pedagogy” (Bonawitz et al., 2011, p. 322). In their research, looking at how explicit instruction 
affects learning through exploratory play in pre-school aged children, they found that, 
although teacher instruction speeds up children’s understanding of the function of a toy, it 
can also hinder children’s further exploration of a toy, thereby restricting the learning benefits 
of exploratory play. They conclude that a combination of the efficiency of pedagogical 
transmission, with encouragement toward exploratory play, should maximise learning in the 
short and long term. Scaling this up to the teacher-learner relationship in traditional Islamic 
education, a clear practical solution emerges that requires skillful teaching: a pedagogical 
repertoire that is both teacher-led and learner-led. Skillful teaching involves encouraging 
questioning, criticality, awareness of differing arguments, and personal reflection in students; 
combined with the effective and precise transmission of sacred knowledge, through direct 
teaching and instruction. Although at the level of practice, skillful teaching addresses the 
question of learner autonomy in any educational situation, it does not address the more 
fundamental contradiction between teaching sacred knowledge and personal freedom in 
questioning sacred truths. In Islamic education, surely there are limits to critical inquiry, in 
that a learner is not permitted to be critical about matters of creed or dogma. However, this 
critique does not recognise the requirement in Islam to arrive at faith through the use of the 
‘aql (intellect). Neither does it recognise that the aporia of choice-submission is inherent to the 
Islamic creed. It is true that the teacher is a necessary spiritual and intellectual guide, who 
enables the learner to appreciate the truth of Islam, submit as a Muslim through an intellectual 
understanding of the text, and to attain spiritual submission to Allah through reflective self-
knowledge. However, in this context, a new question arises, i.e. how far can any authority, 
however strong, teach this type of submission without the learner making an active choice. 
Without the learner’s autonomous choice, the act of submission becomes meaningless. Does 
this mean that authority and autonomy are actually mutually defining? Rather than being a 
matter of either/or, is it not that both are necessary to achieve the objective of Islamic 
education? In the case of an adult who has converted to Islam and sought out a teacher that 
she wishes to learn from, there is a conscious choice, and the relationship between authority 
and autonomy is accepted; yet what may be said for a young child being taught in a madrasah. 
How far does she exercise any kind of autonomy? Does she really choose to submit? What 
kind of Islamic education would help support this child’s education? 
 
It could be argued, as has been famously done by Amartya Sen (1985), that there is a limit to 
all our choices; a child newly born has no choice but to accept the authority of her parents, 
and she is limited in many other ways, such as by gender, class, the language and culture of 
the family home, etc. Furthermore, the concept of choice only applies when a person has the 
capacity to choose, which itself requires the ability to think, to envisage alternatives, and to 
be aware of one’s own feelings; in other words, to have a mind that is aware of itself, has 
experiences, and has beliefs about the world. Is it not the role of education to facilitate the 
development of such an individual? Accordingly, should not Islamic education aspire to 
create these skills and this capacity? Certainly, it could be argued, that the outcome of early 
Prophetic halaqah, where he educated the new believers, were individuals who acted 
autonomously in relation to their new belief and new life.  
 
More recently, has the goal of personal autonomy been neglected in Islamic education? As in 
all educational communities, a range of contemporary Muslim thinkers have reflected on 
these issues (al-Attas, 1979; Davids & Waghid, 2016; Panjwani, 2009; Sahin, 2013; Shah, 2015). 
Theoretically at least, it can be argued that Islamic education is about enabling the flourishing 
of the human being’s autonomy until she, as an active agent, chooses to be Muslim; therefore, 
as with any educational process, the possibility of an outcome that is not intended is 
inevitable. That is, she could choose to exercise her agency to reject Islam. This is a given 
within the Islamic worldview of human accountability in the ākhira (hereafter), for choices 
made in this life. As al-Ghazali says: “O Son! Live your life as you see fit, for you will surely 
die. Desire what you want, for you will surely depart. Do what you want, for you will surely 
pay for it. Gather up what you want, for you will surely leave it behind” (2010, p. 94). 
Nevertheless, to what extent is there room for criticality in relation to the authority of the 
teacher in Islamic education? There is no doubt that, as the possessor of sacred knowledge, 
the teacher holds an eminent place in Islam. However, in classical Islamic education, students 
choose their teachers and thus have the right to select based on judgments of quality, 
character, intellect, etc.; demonstrating that it is the student’s opinion that establishes the 
authority of any given teacher. Moreover, classical Muslim scholarship has commented in 
varying ways about the agency of the student in the activity of learning (Guenther, 2006, 2016). 
This suggests the possibility of a kind of deep, critical, dialogic inquiry that can be conducted 
at every level of education and with pupils of all ages. Nevertheless, classical scholarship did 
not attend to questions of autonomy in education in the same way that this paper is doing. 
Addressing notions of autonomy, with all it’s secular-liberal framings, from within an Islamic 
paradigm, naturally raises questions of authenticity.   
 
Autonomy as Selfhood 
I now move to this question of authenticity. Wherein lies the reality of that autonomy that 
makes submission to authority authentic, if it is not within our selves? By identifying an 
Islamic concept of selfhood, where the act of being Muslim is an ongoing choice, this question 
moves beyond apologetics and begins to address the problem of autonomy more 
authentically. In Memon and Zaman (2016), various scholars discuss the educational 
possibilities of a Muslim self. Gunther (2016) explores a range of classical scholar’s writings in 
relation to education and human growth and development. Winter (Winter, 2016) begins to 
draw out the importance of the classical spiritual/mystical reading of human learning in 
regenerating an authentic and holistic approach to the development of ‘aql (intellect). Burrell 
(2016) asserts that it is through the practice of learning that the self is transformed in its 
relationship to the divine; whilst Trevathan (2016), an ex-head teacher, queries whether a 
striving for authenticity (ikhlāṣ) of the self can be perceived as a regaining of spiritual 
education in Islamic faith-schools.  
 
Davids and Waghid (2016) focus on the ethical dimensions of the Muslim self, relating this to 
autonomy, to community, and to education, through application of liberal discourse to Islamic 
ethical discourses. In an important contribution to the field, they draw heavily on the Quran 
and Islamic scholarship to present a rigorous argument, ‘that an ethical Muslim education is 
underscored by the practice of autonomous, critical and deliberative engagement that can 
engender reflective judgement, compassionate recognition and a responsible ethical (Muslim) 
community’2 (2016). There are however, two important aspects of Davids and Waghid’s work 
that do not align with my attempt at theorising Muslim selfhood. Firstly, they draw on a neo-
Kantian view to rationalise Muslim ethical behaviour. As stated previously, Alexander has 
shown that a Kantian basis for approaching faith-education in secular-liberal societies is 
problematic (2015). Secondly, Davids and Waghid seek to identify the liberal term, autonomy, 
with the Islamic concept of ijtiḥād. Ijtiḥād is a specific scholarly/legal term, usually associated 
with jurisprudence and translated as independent legal reasoning; there is also a dimension 
of due diligence encapsulated in the term. There is no doubt that this term does point towards 
a God-given natural freedom in humankind, Kamali for example, discusses ijtiḥād in relation 
to Islamic concepts of freedom (Kamali, 2002). However, it is a stretch to conceptualise ijtiḥād 
as personal autonomy, as it is considered a legal process, as opposed to a state of being and 
agency.  
 
Yet, a conceptualisation of personal autonomy from within an Islamic paradigm may help to 
address the challenges facing Muslim educators who are working in faith schools in minority 
contexts. It will also contribute to the growing literature in the English language on updating 
Islamic philosophies of education, generating theory and impacting practice. Below, I present 
an Islamic theory of personhood as shakhsiyah Islamiyah as a way forward to meet these aims. 
 
Shakhsiyah Islamiyah as Muslim Selfhood 
It could be argued that developing autonomy is inherent to developing shakhsiyah.  
Shakhsiyah is an Arabic word that can be translated as personality, figure, character, 
persona/personage, individuality, spirit, and subjectivity. However, by adding the term 
Islamiyah, it could be construed to mean a strong, committed, personal/individual, but Islamic 
 
2 This quotation is from the back cover of the book.  
character. Such a person will have the qualities of critical thinking; reflexivity; active and 
autonomous learning, which is purposeful and action-oriented (practicing and connecting 
what has been learnt); and a strong sense of morality and spirituality. He will seek out 
knowledge and avenues for personal growth through self-aware dialogical encounter. 
Shakhsiyah Islamiyah also involves a deep commitment to the Islamic way of life and 
embodies the meaning of the word Muslim, which means to attain peace through submission 
to the will and law of Allah.  
 
Although the term shakhsiyah is widely used in the Arab and Muslim world, unlike ijtiḥād, it 
is not a traditional theological term. Rather, it came into prominence during the twentieth 
century when Muslim scholars began to talk about shakhsiyah Islamiyah or Islamic 
personality/character. It is possible that this new usage reflects the apologetic atmosphere in 
the postcolonial Muslim world, where society was reacting to the intellectual and cultural 
discourses of ‘westernised’ modernity. The emphasis on the individual self that shakhsiyah 
as a term provides, is not a natural aspect of the classical Islamic intellectual milieu. Islam is 
heavily communitarian in orientation and, like other non-western philosophies, does not 
actively distinguish the personal self from its communal existence.  A traditional 
understanding of the submitted Muslim self recognises human frailty in front of the power of 
Allah.  Allah is not only al-Khāliq (Creator) but also al-Razzāq (Sustainer). The Quran 
repeatedly exhorts human beings to question their self-sufficiency (Quran 80:5; 96:7); asking 
humanity to recognise their dependency on their environment, each other, and ultimately 
Allah. The Quran points to holism; that the individual is simply a small part of the whole. 
Holism is found across indigenous cultures, expressed in “different ways… but…concerned 
with the groundedness (or otherwise) of an individual as an entity related to and indivisible 
from the rest of the world” (Mika, 2015, p. 1136). Nevertheless, this holism does not diminish 
the Quranic address to the individual person, where the choice to accept Islam is a free and 
personal one (Quran 2:256); neither does it detract from the deeply rooted Islamic idea of 
personal responsibility and accountability that relies on a notion of human agency.  
 
There are two reasons for appropriating the term shakhsiyah Islamiyah into a twenty-first 
century Islamic educational theory. Firstly, the concept of shakhsiyah as an individual child’s 
personal character enables an emphasis on his unique characteristics. This is essential when 
translating the traditional Islamic concept of education as tarbiyah, a personalised form of 
education, into the modern mass-schooling context. Secondly, when educating Muslims in a 
minority context, within a dominantly secular-liberal society, there is an enhanced need for 
the individual shakhṣ to continuously choose to be Muslim. In an increasingly hostile socio-
political context, the Muslim’s faith will be constantly questioned and may require re-
affirmation on a daily basis. Thus, the Islamic concept of no intermediary between self and 
Allah becomes ever more pronounced and important.  
 
Shakhsiyah Islamiyah as a dialogical Muslim-self 
The concept of shakhsiyah Islamiyah draws on both the element of agency inherent in Quranic 
discourse, and the holistic conceptualisation of the individual human being as part of a greater 
whole, by adopting an understanding of the Muslim shakhṣ as a dialogical self. By ‘dialogical’ 
here, I mean a self that is formed, grows and develops in relation to the other. Moreover, 
through bringing together the self-conscious personal/individual nature of the term 
shakhsiyah, with the worldview/state of being implied in the term Islamiyah, ‘shakhsiyah 
Islamiyah’ necessarily becomes a self in dialogue with its worldview. The Quran alludes to 
three dialogical relationships that the Muslim actively engages in, and that shape her being: 
relationship with self, with Allah and with the rest of creation, that is, other human beings, 
animals, natural environment and universe (Bakhtiar, 2008, p.xxxiii). These three 
relationships in turn are interrelated into a holistic experience, through which there is either 
personal growth, or decline into khusr (a state of loss) (Quran 103:1-3). There is a well-defined 
trajectory for this growth in the Quranic conceptualisations of the states of the dialogical self 
as it becomes more aware of itself through interaction in its three relationships, all of which 
are enveloped in the infinite Other that is Allah. This is illustrated in Figure 2  
 
Figure 2 Three stages of self-development in Islam 
 
The Quranic emphasis on each person’s direct relationship to Allah, without intermediary, 
can be found in the dialogical enactment of the five daily prayers. According to a Prophetic 
saying, the core recitation in each prayer, Surah al- Fātiḥah, consists of a dialogue with Allah. 
The Quran also states, “And when My servants ask you, [O Muhammad], concerning Me - 
indeed I am near. I respond to the invocation of the supplicant when he calls upon Me. So, let 
them respond to Me [by obedience] and believe in Me that they may be [rightly] guided”. 
(Quran 2:186). The relationship with Allah is indelibly linked to the relationship with one’s 
own self according to al-Ghazāli who begins his famous compendium, ‘The Alchemy of 
Happiness’ with, “Know that the key to knowledge of God, may He be honoured and 
glorified, is knowledge of one’s own self.” (2008, p. 7). He continues by evidencing his 
argument with hadīth (Prophetic saying) and the Quranic verse, ‘We shall show them Our 
(āyāt) signs on the horizons and within themselves, so that it will become evident to them that 
it is the Truth.’ (Quran 41:53). Through this āyah (verse), al-Ghazali demonstrates the dual 
meaning of āyah (sign). In Islamic thought, the signs towards Allah are to be found both in 
reality, which includes the human self, and in revelation, which is considered the direct speech 
of God. The term for Quranic verses, āyat, also literally translates as ‘signs’. The Quranic 
worldview places human beings in a world of signs that provide a dialogical route to greater 
understanding of themselves, their surroundings and their Creator (Lings, 2006). 
Additionally, through this verse, al-Ghazāli demonstrates that these signs are to be found in 
the self, and thus points to the need for a dialogical understanding of the self. Al-Ghazāli’s 
thought has inspired contemporary Muslim intellectuals to consider the implication of the 
dialogical encounter for addressing the challenges faced by contemporary Muslims (Khan, 
2013; Moosa, 2005). For al-Ghazāli, knowledge in all its forms is key to personal growth; 
knowledge is grasped and understood by the ‘aql (intellect) and becomes embodied in the qalb 
(heart). For al-Ghazāli, education is holistic, transformative and lifelong; above all it requires 
agency and self-actualisation through spiritual and intellectual disciplines that lead to divine 
inspiration. The pinnacle of human agency and self-realisation is to choose to fully and 
actively submit to Allah, by overcoming the weaknesses in the nafs (self), thus coming to a 
dialogical realisation of the truth by encountering Allah and reaching a stage of tranquility 




In this paper, I have attempted to ground the conceptualisation of shakhsiyah Islamiyah as a 
dialogical Muslim-self within a broad Islamic paradigm. The Islamic dimension of this 
conceptualisation is intensified when the idealised dialogical Muslim-self is juxtaposed with 
an idealised secular-liberal autonomous and dialogical self (Kazepides, 2012). The extensive 
discussion of secular-liberal ideas of personal autonomy in the first half of this paper serves 
to highlight the tensions that exist within and between these two paradigms; and necessarily 
within the acts of education and teaching, where authority and autonomy are in constant 
interplay. These tensions are well recognised in the field of dialogic education where 
researchers have actively examined how they play out in classrooms within a range of cultural 
contexts (Mercer et al., 2019).  
 
My conceptualization of shakhsiyah Islamiyah has some parallels with contemporary 
dialogical-self theory, as derived from Bakhtin (Bakhtin, 1981), and advanced by Hermans 
and Hermans-Konopka. The latter propose that through  
 
“the interface of different cultures, a self emerges with a complexity that reflects the 
contradictions, oppositions, encounters, and integrations that are part of the society at 
large and, at the same time, answers to these influences from its own agentic point of 
view.” (Hermans and Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 2).  
 
I contend that shakhsiyah Islamiyah has the potential to be such a self and that it can therefore 
be fruitfully employed as an aim of Islamic education in Muslim educational contexts 
generally. Moreover, it will be of particularly valuable in Muslim minority and multicultural 
contexts, where Muslim children and young people are growing up between competing 
paradigms and between cultures. The dialogic dimension of shakhsiyah Islamiyah allows for 
nuance, complexity and awareness of context, it offers self-awareness, agency and genuine 
mutual respect, even where there is real and non-reconcilable disagreement. Furthermore, it 
offers an awareness of the aporia within Islam and a solution to tensions between Islam and 
secular-liberalism, particularly those around the personal autonomy of Muslim children and 
their parents’ rights to educate them within a faith tradition. It offers an Islamic notion of 
autonomy/agency that is both faithful to the Islamic call to submission to Allah and meets the 
educational needs of young Muslims growing up in secular-liberal societies. It has the 
capacity to facilitate a more critical and self-aware form of Islamic education that encourages 
criticality, self-reflection and awareness of the complexity of selfhood within a faith tradition. 
It offers an authentic theorisation of Muslim selfhood by drawing upon Islamic scriptural and 
scholarly resources, whilst recognising contemporary demands.  Additionally, it informs 
wider debates about personal autonomy, selfhood and in particular dialogical-self theory. It 
has the capacity to work alongside dialogic educational approaches within Islamic 
educational settings to provide an authentic, yet critically self-aware education for young 
Muslims as illustrated in Ahmed, (2020).  
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Appendix: An Islamic worldview 
There are many misconceptions about Islam and Islamic education. Therefore, it is useful at 
this point to summarise a generally, although not wholly, agreed upon Islamic worldview, in 
order to give the reader a deeper understanding of foundational Islamic beliefs. It is hoped 
that this understanding may lead to some empathy with the double-consciousness 
experienced by British Muslims, and an appreciation of the need to generate a holism in 
Muslim identity. This summary of Islamic epistemology and ontology is from my own 
reading of Islamic texts supplemented by attending ḥ alaqah and seminars. It is not intended 
to fully encompass all perspectives in the vast Islamic intellectual tradition. Rather, it provides 
an umbrella understanding of normative Sunnī Islamic teachings, particularly from a neo-
Ghazalian tradition.  
 
Islam begins by asserting tawḥīd (the holism, oneness or unity of Allah (God)), and extending 
this to unity of creation; unity of knowledge; unity, and therefore equality, of humanity; unity 
of those who have testified and submitted (Muslims); unity of dīn (Islamic way of life); and 
unity of every other concept and human endeavour within Islamic culture. Human nature, 
fiṭrah, is essentially good, in that human beings have a natural disposition to recognise; know 
and love Allah; and live by Islam, which is known as dīn-ul-fiṭrah and is the natural way of 
living. Human beings are khalīfat-ul-arḍ (stewards of God on earth); our natural role in the 
universe is to take responsibility for the rest of creation by fulfilling the will of Allah.  
 
The literal meaning of Islam is peace through submission; living by Islamic teachings brings 
sakīnah (inner tranquillity) and salām (outward peace and harmony on earth). Insān (the 
human) is the best of creation as s/he has unique attributes of irādah (freewill) and ‘aql 
(intellect), the latter being the capacity to acquire and use ‘ilm (knowledge). It is through 
knowledge that a person comes to know his inner potential and attains pure submission to 
Allah in inner and outward actions. The Quran repeatedly exhorts humans to use their ‘aql 
(intellect) and tafakkur (reflection) to come to know Allah through his āyāt (signs). In the 
Islamic paradigm, knowledge is located in the qalb (heart) as well as the mind.  
The Quran makes seeking knowledge an obligation, asking the believers: ‘Can they who know 
and they who do not know be deemed equal?’ (Quran, 39:9). Thus, knowledge is sought 
internally and externally. Human beings have been given senses and ‘aql (intellect) to 
understand the material world. They have been given the Quran and ‘aql (insight) to 
understand the internal world. In Islamic ontology, from the tawḥīd perspective, there is a 
material world with a unified objective reality.  All objective knowledge lies with Allah. ‘For 
with Him3 are the keys to things beyond the reach of a created being’s perception: none knows 
them but He. And He knows all that is on land and in the sea; and not a leaf falls but He knows 
it.’ (Quran, 6:59) Human beings bring multiple perspectives and interpretive frameworks to 
our understandings of this world. The limited human mind/heart cannot attain totality of 
knowledge. Nevertheless, it is through seeking external and internal knowledge that we fulfil 
our purpose. The search for truth leads ultimately to Allah. It is through tarbiyah (personal 
development/education) that human beings realise their purpose and attain their true worth 
as the ‘best of creation’. (Ahmed, 2012) 
This development can be viewed as a dialogic journey.  
‘The monotheistic worldview sees the universal unity in existence, a unity of three 
separate relationships: (1) our relationship with others, nature and the universe; (2) 
our relationship with God; (3) our relationship with our ‘self’. These relationships are 
not alien to one another; there are no boundaries between them. They move in the 
same direction.’ (Bakhtiar, 2008, p. xxxiii). 
 
Within this worldview, Islamic intellectual heritage is not monolithic; Islam is an incredibly 
rich and diverse tradition. Yet it does have a core unity that has traditionally been maintained 
through ikhtilāf, a juristic agreement of mutual respect for intra-religious difference, however, 
its literal translation can also mean divergence, variance, diversity and otherness (Murad, 
1999). Thus, the individual’s relationship with others is a core element of a major strand of 
Islamic thought. The key figure in this tradition is the twelfth century scholar Abu Hamid 
Muhammad al-Ghazali (1058-1111CE); which is picked up on by the twentieth century Malay 
Muslim scholar Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas (b. 1931), who has been described as neo-




3 Gender is not a characteristic of Allah, Who ‘nothing is comparable to’. (Quran 114:4). However, Arabic is a gendered 
language and accepted practice is to use the male pronoun. 
